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Abstract 
British foreign policy stands at a turning point following the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum. Drawing on 
role theory, we trace the UK’s efforts to establish new foreign policy roles as it interacts with concerned 
international actors. We find that the pro-Brexit desire to ‘take back control’ has not yet translated into 
a cogent foreign policy direction. In its efforts to avoid adopting the role of isolate, the UK has projected 
a disoriented foreign policy containing elements of partially incompatible roles such as great power, 
global trading state, leader of the Commonwealth, regional partner to the EU, and faithful ally to the 
US. The international community has, through processes of socialization and alter-casting, largely 
rejected these efforts. These role conflicts between the UK and international actors, as well as conflicts 
among its different role aspirations, has pressed UK policies towards its unwanted isolationist role, 
potentially shaping its long-term foreign policy orientation post-Brexit. 
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The 2016 British referendum decision to leave the European Union (EU) represents a major 
rupture in Britain’s international position.1 Brexit has sparked intense debate about Britain’s 
place in the world and will require “the largest rewiring of British foreign policy since World 
War II”.2 Pre-Brexit, Britain’s role orientation as an influential actor on the world stage3 was 
anchored in its EU membership which stood out as the “inner circle”4 of Britain’s broader 
international leverage. Leaving the EU will thus remove a central pillar of British foreign policy 
and lead to a fundamental change in Britain’s international role. At the same time, how this re-
orientation of British foreign policy will play out is still uncertain. While the ‘taking back 
control’ message of the ‘Leave’ campaign foregrounded the enhanced sovereignty Britain 
would achieve, specific foreign policy directions any gains in sovereignty afforded were not 
clearly articulated. Moreover, most of Britain’s international partners were critical of Brexit 
before the referendum and have since developed their own views on what Brexit signifies5 for 
Britain’s future place in international politics.6 Central to this question is Britain’s ability to 
simultaneously enhance its autonomy and find meaningful foreign policy roles for itself while 
avoiding becoming an isolated state.  
 
This article aims to navigate the international debates and uncertainty around Britain’s post-
Brexit foreign policy at this early but critical juncture. We use role theory to demonstrate how 
Britain is being socialised into foreign policy roles through interactions with other states in the 
international system.7  Specifically, we focus on Britain’s role location process8  since the 
referendum, identifying a set of foreign policy roles that Britain has either casted for or rejected 
and tracing how role expectations of other relevant international actors have affected these 
efforts. We argue that role conflicts between Britain’s conceptions of its own roles and 
international expectations towards Britain, along with the tensions and inconsistencies between 
the different roles Britain seeks to play, have not only increased uncertainty but may also be 
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contributing to Britain’s unwanted drift toward greater isolationism. While the economic and 
political outcome of Brexit is not yet clear, the early socialisation process reveals the core 
prospects of Britain’s role on the world stage and illuminates the long-term boundaries and 
opportunities for Britain’s post-Brexit foreign policy orientation.    
 
Our analysis builds on previous research using role theory to understand British foreign policy.9 
The benefits of mapping the future of British foreign policy through role theory are twofold. 
First, this perspective emphasises the relational and interactive nature of roles states play in the 
international arena. Just as people cannot play the role of teachers unless others take up the role 
of students, states cannot adopt a role for themselves unless this role is accepted by other states. 
Britain’s foreign policy after Brexit will not be defined simply by what role Britain wants to 
play, but equally by what role other states let Britain play. Second, role theory provides a broad 
perspective on the foreign policy orientation of post-Brexit Britain, moving us beyond the day-
to-day politics of Brexit and toward more fundamental role interaction processes that are 
playing out, thus offering “a means of interpreting current events in the light of their long-term 
implications”.10  
 
We propose that Brexit significantly transforms roles available to and expected for Britain and 
offer a role theoretical take on British foreign policy for the post-Brexit environment. This 
environment involves a collision between Britain’s preferred roles and those acceptable to 
international society. Empirically, our main purpose is to contribute to the academic discussion 
about British foreign policy after Brexit, which has only just begun.11 Theoretically, the article 
adds to the growing body of role theoretical work in International Relations,12 specifically 
connecting to discussions of role socialisation13 and the importance of role conflict.14   
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Viewing Brexit through role theory reveals the central irony that the one role Britain has tried 
to prevent since the referendum – that of isolate – might emerge as precisely the role it is 
socialised into. Although Britain is casting for various alternative foreign policy roles (global 
trading state, great power, faithful ally to the US, regional partner to the EU and leader of the 
Commonwealth), these involve some mutual incompatibilities, and international responses to 
them have largely been sceptical. Such role rejections, in consequence, could push Britain 
towards the isolate role. The one other foreign policy role that looks most feasible – that of 
faithful ally to the US – is also tinged with the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ brand 
of isolationism. It is not our objective, however, to explore the relative weight the British 
government places on each of the roles it casts for. Rather, from our role theoretical perspective, 
which roles the government will come to prioritise will only emerge from the interactions 
between Britain and other international actors in the on-going role location process. 
 
Role Location and Role Conflict 
Role theory draws on a theatrical metaphor, seeing states in the international arena – like actors 
on a stage – playing roles that follow certain scripts.15 Roles are “repertoires of behaviour, 
inferred from others’ expectations and one’s own conceptions, selected at least partly in 
response to cues and demands”. 16  Roles thus emerge from the interaction between role 
conceptions – an actor’s own preference for their roles – and role expectations ascribed to an 
actor by others. Roles prescribe certain behaviours which actors consider appropriate given 
their place in social structures.17 Holsti18 introduced role theory to the study of international 
relations, identifying several prototypical roles such as faithful ally, regional leader, and isolate. 
Contemporary role theory research19 examines how states (egos) define and change roles20 and 
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how other international actors (alters) try to influence and socialise states as they seek new 
roles.21 
 
The social and strategic interactions between ego and alter(s) through which ego finds a 
suitable international role is the role location process.22 For role theory, role location dynamics 
are socialisation, where states ‘learn’ their foreign policy roles in response to cues and demands 
of others.23 When a state casts for a new foreign policy role, it draws other international actors 
into this process. Alters may accept or reject ego’s preferred role and may alter-cast and 
socialise ego into alternative roles. If ego’s role conception and alters’ expectations are 
congruent, ego’s role is available and can be enacted. If they differ, role conflict ensues with 
each trying to promote or foreclose roles for ego.24  
 
Role conflicts are an important yet understudied aspect of role theory in foreign policy.25 
Although a variety of role conflicts are possible,26 we focus on two types.  First role conflicts 
can occur between ego and alter(s) regarding specific roles ego might play.27 In a successful 
role location process, repeated interactions between ego and alters lead to convergence of their 
views on the role ego should play, resolving role conflicts. Second, inter-role conflicts arise 
when ego pursues two or more roles entailing contradictory behaviours,28 which may result in 
fragmented and incoherent foreign policy.29 Given its limited theoretical attention to date, our 
analysis explores the impact of these two types of role conflicts for Britain as they affect the 
early stages of role socialisation during Brexit.   
 
While international roles are created through interactions between alters and ego, role theory 
invests both ego and alters with considerable scope for agency.30 Especially during the initial 
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stages of role location, ego has significant autonomy in selecting roles it casts for, just as alters 
have discretion in how to respond to ego and to push different roles. This scope for agency 
narrows as interactions between ego and alter delimit the set of roles available for ego.31 When 
a state has been socialised into particular roles as a result of this process, these roles will 
ultimately impact how the state conducts its foreign policy.32 Early stages of role location and 
the resolution of role conflicts are thus crucial to the eventual foreign policy orientation of a 
state.  
 
We are interested in this early stage precisely because the roles available to Britain after it 
leaves the EU are still in flux, but are increasingly being circumscribed through its interactions 
with others. We trace how Britain, after the referendum, casted for a range of foreign policy 
roles, examining the international responses to each of these. We do not focus on domestic 
contestation over Britain’s future international roles. Rather, we take the government as the 
agent representing Britain on the international stage, explore the foreign policy roles it seeks 
to adopt for Britain, and examine international expectations in the post-Brexit role location 
process.  
 
Empirically, the early stage of role location consists mainly of verbal government statements 
and claims, and only to a limited extent material foreign policy behaviours. Consequently, we 
reconstruct the roles Britain has cast for primarily through analysis of foreign policy speeches 
and other public interventions, for example op-ed articles, of leading members of Britain’s 
foreign policy executive, namely the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Secretary of State for 
Exiting the EU, Secretary of State for International Trade and Defence Secretary. We have 
identified major contributions of these actors to the Brexit debate on the British government 
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website and in the press during the timeframe from immediately after the June 2016 EU 
referendum up and until the time of writing in March 2019. Specifically, our empirical analysis 
builds on references to more than 30 oral and written interventions of the selected government 
members. For the international responses to Britain’s role-casting, we mainly rely on press 
reports about reactions from the governments of a range of Britain’s international partners as 
well as the EU and other international organisations, as well as some limited interviews. The 
article thus adopts a method that is well-established in role theory research which explores role 
location principally through the lens of the speech acts of high-level decision makers.33 Such 
speech acts constitute meaningful and consequential behaviours that draw other international 
actors into the role location process and contribute to carving out Britain’s roles after Brexit. 
Over the longer term, however, the sustainability of any such roles will also depend on 
government discourse being supported by material capabilities and behaviours of both ego and 
alters.34  
 
The five roles we discuss have been pursued with some consistency by the British government 
and are in our judgment the most prominent roles in government discourse on British foreign 
policy since the referendum. While decision-makers generally do not make explicit references 
to these roles, we have discerned them from government statements that emphasise their core 
features and that can be interpreted as indicators of the roles. For each of the roles we then 
explore responses from a variety of international actors who are implicated by them. In this 
way, we use roles Britain has cast for to focus our analysis of international responses. It is 
important to note that the discourse the British government employs to cast for international 
roles may in part be strategic or merely rhetorical. For example, it might be used to strengthen 
Britain’s hand in the Brexit negotiations with the EU or for domestic political consumption. 
Irrespective of whether or not government members genuinely believe that Britain can and 
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should play the roles they cast for, their discourse will nevertheless elicit international 
responses and feed into a process that delimits roles available to Britain after Brexit.  
 
Locating Foreign Policy Roles for Post-Brexit Britain  
Britain’s efforts to locate a role since the referendum take place against the backdrop of 
international scepticism about Brexit.35 Nevertheless, Britain has claimed that leaving the EU 
has broadened, not narrowed, the set of substantive foreign policy roles it can play by virtue of 
the sovereignty it gained. In particular, Britain tried to counter international role forecasts that 
Brexit will leave Britain a diminished international actor and to avoid being socialised into the 
foreign policy role of an isolationist actor. British efforts to enact foreign policy roles, however, 
have largely elicited negative international responses. The foreign policy roles Britain has 
casted for can be identified as global trading state, great power, faithful ally to the US, regional 
partner to the EU and leader of the Commonwealth. These roles vary in the autonomy they 
offer, and who the key alters are that can effectively accept or reject each role. But what these 
roles have in common, first and foremost, is Britain’s rejection of the isolate role.36 
 
Isolate 
The post-referendum priority of the British government on the international stage was to avoid 
being socialised into the isolate role, which would see Britain draw back from the international 
stage, downscale the resources it expends externally and focus largely on domestic concerns.37 
To avoid this role, Britain countered an emerging narrative that it might retrench from its 
international commitments and turn inwards. 38  Indeed, the widespread view among 
international commentators was that the decision to leave the EU was a vote to go it alone, 
putting Britain on a “voyage to inglorious isolation”.39  From this perspective, the Brexit 
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referendum was an “isolationist catastrophe”40 that brought to a head a pre-existing trend of 
Britain disengaging from the world. Interviews with members of the German Bundestag in 
June 2017 reinforced this view that Brexit was an act of British self-demotion that would 
marginalise its international voice.41 Britain’s international adversaries, most notably Russia, 
also see Brexit as isolating Britain and seek to capitalise on Britain’s perceived weakness.42 
What is more, there is evidence that the Russian government attempted to interfere in the 
referendum to support the case for leaving the EU.43 
 
Immediately after the referendum, leading ‘Leave’ campaigners and the British government 
advanced an internationalist counter-narrative to dispel notions that Britain was heading 
towards isolationism. Boris Johnson, the most popular face of the ‘Leave’ argument, used his 
column in the Eurosceptic Daily Telegraph days after the referendum to spin Brexit away from 
the ‘Leave’ side’s predominantly nationalist and inward-facing message, stating “[M]illions of 
people who voted Leave were (…) inspired by the belief that Britain is a great country, and 
that outside the job-destroying coils of EU bureaucracy we can survive and thrive as never 
before. (…) There is every cause for optimism; a Britain rebooted, reset, renewed and able to 
engage with the whole world.”44 
 
Picking up on a common trope of the ‘Leave’ campaign which likened EU membership to 
imprisonment45 and which urged voters to “free ourselves from Europe’s shackles”46, this 
counter-narrative depicts Brexit as ending Britain’s self-imposed isolationism inside the EU 
and instead “re-engaging this country with its global identity”.47 In his first official United 
Nations visit as Foreign Minister (FM), Johnson also distanced Britain’s decision to leave the 
EU from the ‘America first’ message of then Republican Presidential nominee Donald Trump, 
stating “I would draw a very, very strong contrast between Brexit and any kind of isolationism. 
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(…) Brexit means us being more outward-looking, more engaged, more enthusiastic and 
committed on the world stage than ever before.”48 
 
Similarly, Secretary of State for International Trade Liam Fox49 told an audience in Bogota 
that international speculations that Brexit was “a symptom of insularity, and that the United 
Kingdom would be withdrawing from the world stage” were unfounded: “I am here to tell you 
that nothing, absolutely nothing, could be further from the truth”. In the words of PM Theresa 
May in a speech delivered in India, Britain was “determined not to turn our backs to the 
world”.50 Britain thus tried to undercut impressions that Brexit equals “little Englanderism”51 
and resisted being socialised into the role of an isolationist state.52 If not isolate, the question 
then was what sort of role Britain would actually seek to play. 
 
Global Trading State 
After the referendum, Britain has made a sustained effort to cast for the role of a global trading 
state. This role envisages Britain as an outward-looking, liberal and internationalist leader on 
global free trade. Along these lines, the British government has portrayed a ‘Global Britain’ 
that would emerge after ‘Brexit.’ This has become a primary frame through which it depicts 
Britain’s new foreign policy orientation.  
 
As a country that is “by instinct a great, global, trading nation”,53 Britain would remain “a great 
champion”54 and a “tireless advocate of global free trade”.55 It would “continue to make the 
case for liberalism and globalisation” and show “calm, determined, global leadership to shape 
a new era of globalisation”.56 Indeed, leaving the EU is an opportunity for Britain to become 
“more outward looking than ever”57 and to “step up to a new leadership role as the strongest 
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and most forceful advocate for business, free markets and free trade anywhere in the world”.58 
This is, according to the British government, how the Brexit referendum should be understood. 
“[T]he British people voted for change. (…) They voted to leave the European Union and 
embrace the world. (…) June the 23rd was not the moment Britain chose to step back from the 
world. It was the moment we chose to build a truly Global Britain.”59 
 
It is precisely the sovereignty gained through the Brexit referendum that allows Britain to enact 
the role of a global trading state. For the British government, the referendum was “a vote to 
take control and make decisions for ourselves and, crucially, to become even more global and 
internationalist in action and in spirit”.60 After Brexit, Britain will have “for the first time in 
more than four decades (…) a fully independent trade policy”.61 This gives it the “opportunity 
to forge new trade deals around the world”62 and “to reassert our belief in a confident, sovereign 
and global Britain.”63 “We are going to be a confident country that is in control of its own 
destiny again. And it is because of that that we will be in a position to act in this global role.”64 
 
The international reaction, however, to such attempts to cast itself as a global trading state is 
largely sceptical. Many of Britain’s international partners have emphasised the complexities in 
negotiating trade agreements and have made clear that they prioritise their trading relationship 
with the EU over Britain. These concerns were already articulated before the referendum. For 
example, the Director-General of the WTO, Roberto Azevêdo, said Britain would not be 
allowed to “cut and paste” its existing terms of WTO membership if it left the EU, but would 
face “tortuous” re-negotiations of these terms, indicating “Pretty much all of the UK’s trade 
would somehow have to be negotiated. (…) It is extremely difficult and complex to negotiate 
these trade agreements. And slow as well.”65 
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This point was reiterated by the IMF, warning in its 2016 annual report that “negotiations on 
postexit arrangements would likely be protracted”. 66  Significantly, the challenges of 
negotiating post-Brexit trade deals were also raised by Britain’s closest bilateral partner, the 
US. In the most prominent international intervention before the British referendum, US 
President Barack Obama argued in a joint press conference with David Cameron that the US 
priority will be to achieve a trade agreement with the EU while the UK “is going to be in the 
back of the queue.67 Canadian Prime Minister (PM) Justin Trudeau expressed a similar view, 
noting the trade deal between the EU and Canada took almost 10 years to negotiate and that 
“there’s nothing easy or automatic” in negotiating such deals.68 
 
Since the referendum, Britain’s attempts to secure trade commitments from its major non-EU 
trading partners have so far mainly been rebuffed. Britain is thwarted by its lack of sovereignty 
to negotiate trade deals until it has left the EU, and its international partners are reluctant to 
engage in substantive discussions about post-Brexit arrangements until the future British-EU 
relationship becomes clear. For example, FM Hunt had little more to show for his visit to 
Beijing than a vague promise from his Chinese counterpart “to open discussions about a 
possible free trade deal” after Brexit.69 Perhaps the most important example, however, is 
Japan’s response to what has been described as “quite aggressive”70 British attempts to secure 
a commitment to a post-Brexit trade deal at May’s Tokyo visit in August 2017. Japanese 
officials made clear their priority was to finalise free trade negotiations with the EU and were 
unwilling to enter into discussions until they have more clarity about the final terms of Brexit. 
The only commitment the British government gained was that the two countries will carry over 
the trade agreement negotiated between Japan and the EU to their bilateral post-Brexit trading 
relationship.71 A similar arrangement was also floated for Britain’s future trading relationship 
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with Canada.72 Britain’s seeking to copy and paste EU trade deals calls into question the value 
of its enhanced sovereignty after Brexit to enact the role of a global trading state.  
 
The most positive response toward discussing post-Brexit trade deals has so far come from the 
US administration. President Trump has welcomed the prospect of a “major trade deal” with 
Britain, comparing it positively to what he perceives as EU protectionism. On his visit to 
Washington, FM Hunt detected “real enthusiasm from the US administration, from the 
President down, for a UK/US Free Trade Agreement”.73 However, the concerns of British 
consumer groups about food safety standards that resurfaced during Liam Fox’s visit to 
Washington in July 2017 indicate that any future negotiations about a US-Britain trade deal 
may be more protracted than the British government appears to envisage.74 Overall, across a 
range of international actors, with the exception of the US, Britain’s efforts to cast itself into a 
global trading state role have been challenged by assertions that it lacks the autonomy to pursue 
this role. 
 
Great Power 
Since the referendum, Britain has also cast for the role of great power. This role, like the global 
trading state role, is global in scope but differs significantly with its emphasis on superior 
military, economic and institutional resources and the special responsibilities and rights these 
resources confer. While it has often been said that Britain can no longer play the great power 
role,75  ambition for it has experienced a revival post-referendum. This fits with Britain’s 
attempt to reject the role of isolate, but is more ambitious than its efforts to enact the role of a 
global trading state. 
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In casting for a great power role, Britain portrays itself as a major military power with global 
reach and responsibilities. This involves spelling out clear leadership ambitions76 in working 
to “sustain the international rules-based order”77, at times invoking memories of Winston 
Churchill. 78  The government employs a discourse that foregrounds Britain’s “outstanding 
capabilities” as the country with “the biggest defence budget in Europe”79 and “a leading 
member of NATO”.80 Correspondingly, Britain has reaffirmed its commitment to meet NATO 
targets on defence expenditure and has reinforced its contributions to European and 
international security ‘on the ground’.81 Most symbolically, perhaps, Britain committed to 
restore its “military presence East of Suez”82 by rolling out a large-scale investment to re-open 
a naval support facility in Bahrain, “the first such facility East of Suez since 1971”.83 It has 
announced deployment of Royal Navy frigates to the Persian Gulf to achieve an “enduring 
presence” in the region and to demonstrate Britain’s “global reach and world class 
capability”.84 This is framed as a reversal of the policy of disengagement from East of Suez in 
the 1970s, which has come to embody Britain’s retreat from a great power role. 85  That 
disengagement, for FM Johnson, was a historical mistake that the current government has 
corrected: “Britain is back East of Suez”.86 
 
In the same vein, the government’s discourse emphasises its ability to project military power 
on a global scale. Citing a joint air force exercise with Japan and South Korea, Johnson 
reminded an audience in New Delhi that “Britain remains one of a handful of countries able to 
deploy air power 7000 miles from our shores”.87 Similarly, Britain’s two “vast new aircraft 
carriers”88 are described as “a symbol of the United Kingdom as a great global, maritime nation” 
that “will transform the UK’s ability to project power around the world”.89  
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Complementing its claims to superior military power, the British government references its 
economic strength as “the fifth biggest economy on earth” and home to “the greatest financial 
capital in the world”.90 It also emphasises Britain’s wide-ranging soft power assets, invoking, 
norms and values such as democracy, freedom and the rule of law,91 the English language as 
“the language of the world”,92 and the worldwide appeal of “the most visited museums” and 
“the best universities in the world”.93 For May, Britain has “the greatest soft power in the 
world”.94 Another plank of Britain’s claim to great power status is its position as a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council. As May reminded the UN General Assembly, that 
position places “special responsibilities” 95 on Britain which it takes seriously. As befits a great 
power, Britain carries no less than “a commitment to the whole world”.96  
 
The international view of a ‘great power Britain’, however, is quite the opposite, with no 
discernible support for Britain’s assertion that Brexit will strengthen its standing in the world.97 
Rather, the expectation is that Brexit will diminish Britain on the international stage. Before 
the referendum, several international actors, especially from outside the EU, made clear their 
view Britain’s weight as an international partner is enhanced by EU membership and would 
suffer from leaving it. New Zealand PM John Key stated “We certainly think it is a stronger 
position for Britain to be in Europe”.98 Similarly, the German Finance Minister, Wolfgang 
Schäuble, suggested that Brexit would diminish Britain’s influence in international relations: 
“In the era of globalisation, ‘splendid isolation’ is not a smart option”.99 This view was shared 
by interviewees in the German Bundestag in June 2017 who doubted that Britain will even be 
able to play a middle-ranking power role after Brexit.100 The decision to leave the EU is seen 
as accelerating a longer-term decline in Britain’s influence that has it moving from the “first 
team” to the “reserve bench” in international politics.101 Brexit is also widely believed to reduce 
the influence Britain can wield through the UN system.102 An example is Britain’s failure to 
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win support in the UN General Assembly for its candidate as judge in the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), leaving Britain without an ICJ judge for the first time in the court’s history. 
Described as “a humiliating blow to British international prestige”, it might be seen as a 
harbinger of Britain’s reduced status in the UN and on the international stage more generally.103 
Post-Brexit Britain as a great power is in conflict with most international views, and Britain is 
being alter-casted as a diminished international actor for which the great power role is 
unavailable.  
 
Regional Partner to the EU 
Since the Brexit referendum Britain has also casted for the role of regional partner to the EU.104 
This role counters the isolate role but is less global in scope than either great power or global 
trading state. It sees Britain and the EU developing a “deep and special partnership that takes 
in both economic and security cooperation”.105 To enable such a role, the British government 
communicates to its European audience that it wants to become the EU’s “strongest friend and 
partner”.106 It promotes what it describes as a “vision for a bold, ambitious and innovative new 
partnership with (…) our EU friends”107: 
 
We are leaving the European Union but we are not leaving Europe. Our vote to leave 
the European Union was no rejection of the values we share with our European friends. 
The decision to leave the EU represents no desire to become more distant to our 
European neighbours. We will remain strong allies.108 
 
Britain has made clear that it remains committed to European security and close collaboration 
in justice and home affairs. It seeks nothing less than a “new alliance” and a “bold new strategic 
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agreement” with the EU.109 From Britain’s view, the role of regional partner is not hindered by 
Brexit but rather facilitated by the sovereignty it will have gained.  
 
The availability of this role turns largely on the specific shape Brexit will take. In the 
withdrawal agreement negotiations, however, the EU-27 alter-casted Britain more as a 
supplicant than a regional partner. The widespread view is that Britain conducted the 
negotiations as the fundamentally weaker side and that it will disproportionately bear the costs 
of Brexit. According to IMF estimates, Britain’s GDP will contract by almost 4% over the long 
term if Britain leaves the EU without a deal relative to the no-Brexit scenario, compared to a 
fall of only 1.5% for the EU-27.110 In the words of the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, “our British friends will lose more 
than what we will lose”.111  
 
The priority of the EU-27 in the Brexit talks is less about partnering with Britain than with 
maintaining the unity of the remaining member states. To that end, leading EU members, in 
particular Germany and France, are willing to put aside specific economic interests and 
accommodate concerns of smaller member states.112 The guiding principle driving the common 
European line is that the outcome of Brexit negotiations must discourage other EU members 
from following the British example and help prevent further erosion of the EU. Thus any 
agreement about the post-Brexit relationship with Britain must be worse than the terms of full 
EU membership. As Maltese PM Joseph Muscat explained when Malta assumed the EU 
presidency, “we want a fair deal for the UK but that fair deal has to be inferior to 
membership”.113  
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The EU’s main focus is not its post-Brexit relationship to Britain, but rather further deepening 
European integration. For European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, the “wind is 
back in Europe’s sails” since the Brexit referendum. Junker proposes that the EU should “catch 
the wind”, in particular to further integrate around the Eurozone and the Schengen system: “We 
will advance, we must advance because Brexit is not everything. Because Brexit is not the 
future of Europe”.114 Given the views on Brexit in the EU and its focus on keeping European 
integration on track, the scope for Britain to enact the regional partner role is limited.  
 
Leader of the Commonwealth 
Since the Brexit referendum Britain has also casted for the leader of the Commonwealth role, 
which counters the isolate role but is less focused on Europe than the regional partner to the 
EU role. This role centres on upgrading Britain’s historical links to Commonwealth countries 
and turning the Commonwealth into a hub for Britain’s wider diplomatic and economic 
relations.115 Implicitly or explicitly, the role is often framed in terms of reviving the notion of 
an ‘Anglosphere’, advocating a post-Brexit alliance of English-speaking countries. It 
foregrounds the scope for free trade with countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
and ties in with the global trading state role.116 The role is consistent with pre-referendum 
efforts to bring the Commonwealth “back at the very heart of British foreign policy”.117 Post-
referendum, the government intensified these efforts through official visits to a range of 
Commonwealth countries, including Australia, Canada, India, Kenya, New Zealand, Nigeria 
and South Africa. These largely symbolic gestures express the enhanced importance of these 
countries for Britain. During her visit to India in November of 2016 PM May stated “I wanted 
to come to India on my first bilateral visit outside Europe because this relationship matters 
more than ever. (…) As the UK leaves the EU and India continues its rise in the world, we 
should seize the opportunities ahead.”118 
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Britain casts for the Commonwealth leader role by emphasising bonds of shared values and the 
common heritage of its members. Visiting Australia, FM Johnson professed his belief in “the 
Commonwealth’s capacity to strengthen common values among its members”,119  such as 
democracy, the rule of law and an independent judiciary. Similarly, PM May in a joint 
statement with Indian PM Narendra Modi “recalled the strong bonds of friendship” between 
Britain and India: “Our shared history, our shared connections and our shared values make this 
a natural partnership.”120 
 
Moreover, Britain prioritises trade with Commonwealth countries when it pushes for opening 
talks about post-Brexit relations. At the 2017 world economic forum, May highlighted that 
such talks had already begun “with countries like Australia, New Zealand and India”.121 On 
her visit to Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, May invoked the “deep historical ties”122 of the 
Commonwealth to hold out the prospect of “a new partnership between the UK and our friends 
in Africa” that will see the UK become “the G7’s number one investor in Africa”.123 In a speech 
in Sydney, FM Johnson suggested that after Brexit, “Australia will be at, or near, the front of 
the queue for a new Free Trade Agreement with Britain”.124 As for India, Johnson expressed 
Britain’s interest “to turbo charge [British-India relations]” with a new free trade deal.125  
 
The reception of this role by the Commonwealth countries has been lukewarm. Many of these 
countries, including Australia, India, Canada and New Zealand, as well as a range of 
Commonwealth officials, were openly sceptical about Brexit before the referendum. 126 
Australian PM Malcolm Turnbull, for example, indicated having Britain as a close ally in the 
EU was “an unalloyed plus”: “We welcome Britain’s strong role in Europe”.127 Similarly, 
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Commonwealth Secretary-General Patricia Scotland rejected as a “false choice” suggestions 
by Leave campaigners that Britain’s Commonwealth links should replace its EU membership, 
arguing “the Commonwealth offers a huge amount, but the Commonwealth does not set itself 
up in competition with Europe – we are partners.128 Since the referendum, many have also 
objected to the neo-colonial overtones of Britain’s ambition to enact the role of Commonwealth 
leader,129 and even within Whitehall sceptical officials branded the initiative “Empire 2.0”.130 
Such neo-colonial critiques are perhaps even more compelling, given the dissonance between 
a Brexit desire for more sovereignty and Britain’s colonial past. 
 
Commonwealth countries also worry that Brexit will negatively impact their trade relationships 
with the EU.131 New Zealand, for example, will likely prioritise negotiating an EU free trade 
agreement over their future trading relations with Britain.132 India, in turn, considers Britain as 
an entry point into the European single market and might consequently attach less weight to 
Britain as a trading partner after Brexit.133 Indeed, commentaries of May’s visit to India have 
concluded that Britain has “little to offer in exchange for desperately needed post-Brexit trade 
deals”.134 This suggests Britain’s trade negotiating position might be relatively weak: “Britain 
needs India more than India needs Britain”.135 There is little indication that Britain’s effort to 
enact the role of leader of the Commonwealth resonates with the Commonwealth countries, 
challenging its availability. 
 
Faithful Ally to the US 
Britain is also casting for a more limited foreign policy role of faithful ally to the US. This 
pitches Britain as the closest international partner of the US and is expected to secure US 
support for British interests and enhance British influence on the international stage. This 
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“power by proxy”136 strategy underpins Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the US and has 
been a long-standing maxim in British foreign policy. Since the Brexit referendum, Britain 
intensified its affirmation of the continued ‘specialness’ of the relationship with the US. The 
British government discourse weaves together past achievements with the promise of a 
reinvigorated post-Brexit alliance, establishing a sense of continuity that transcends its decision 
to leave the EU. This was to counter concerns that Brexit might reduce the value the US 
attaches to its relations with Britain, which partly comes from Britain’s influence inside the 
EU.137 
 
May’s speech to the Republican Party Conference is the fullest example of British discourse 
on the faithful ally role. She reminded her audience of the “unique and special relationship that 
exists between [Britain and the US]”: 
 
[T]he leadership provided by our two countries through the special relationship has (…) 
made the modern world. (…) It is my honour and privilege to stand before you today 
(…) to join hands as we pick up that mantel of leadership once more, to renew our 
special relationship and to recommit ourselves to the responsibility of leadership in the 
modern world.138 
 
The US has generally reciprocated these role-seeking efforts. Immediately after the referendum, 
many in the US, including President Barack Obama, reassured Britain that the referendum 
outcome will not affect the ‘specialness’ of the US-British relationship. While Obama’s pro-
‘Remain’ interventions in the referendum campaign raised concerns that Brexit would diminish 
US commitment to Britain, after the referendum Obama sought to dispel any doubts: “One 
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thing that will not change is the special relationship that exists between our two nations”.139 
Similar reactions came from other US leaders, including Chairman of the Senate foreign 
relations committee Bob Corker, Republican Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, and State 
Department spokesperson John Kirby.140 When Obama congratulated May on becoming PM 
in July 2016, he assured her that he would “protect and deepen”141 the special relationship.  
 
In contrast to President Obama, Donald Trump spoke out in favour of Brexit during the British 
referendum campaign 142  and welcomed the result while a presidential candidate. Trump 
quickly promised to maintain the special relationship if elected President143 and made clear that 
under his Presidency Britain would “always be at the front of the line”. He claimed “zero will 
change” in US-British relations after Brexit.144 After Trump took office, a strong symbolic 
reaffirmation of the ‘specialness’ of US-British relations came with PM May’s Washington 
visit in January 2017. Both governments highlighted that May was the first foreign Head of 
Government to pay an official visit to the newly-elected US President in Washington.145 For 
May, the invitation to the White House was “an indication of the strength and importance of 
the special relationship”,146 and both President Trump and PM May used the visit to celebrate 
the special quality of the relationship. At their joint press conference on 27 January, Trump 
praised the “free and independent Britain” that emerged from the decision to leave the EU and 
gave his strongest endorsement of the special relationship: 
 
The special relationship between our two countries has been one of the great forces in 
history for justice and for peace (…). Today the United States renews our deep bonds 
with Britain (…). We pledge our lasting support to this most special relationship. (…) 
[O]ur relationship has never been stronger.147 
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For Trump, relations between the US and Britain have reached “the highest level of special”148 
since Brexit. This US response suggests that the role of faithful ally will continue to be 
available for Britain, making British efforts to cast for it feasible.  
 
Two important caveats are in order. First, the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ agenda 
and its economic nationalism create uncertainty for the longer-term sustainability of this role.149 
For example, the US 2017 decisions to impose a punitive tariff on a new model of Bombardier 
passenger jets built in Northern Ireland, despite the personal intervention of PM May,150 and 
to levy tariffs on steel and aluminium imports from the EU, strongly opposed by the British 
government,151 show how little concerns of its faithful ally count when US economic interests 
are seen to be at stake. Trump has also been directly critical of PM May’s handling of the Brexit 
negotiations, suggesting she “would have been successful” if she had followed his advice,152 
and demonstrating further the difficulties Britain faces in keeping its faithful ally role under 
the Trump administration.  
 
Second, this role has become increasingly contested in Britain domestically, especially after 
the 2003 Iraq War.153 Domestic unease with the role is only reinforced by the unpopularity of 
President Trump in British public opinion, with large majorities believing he has made the 
world a more dangerous place and having no confidence in him ‘doing the right thing’ in 
international affairs.154  The widespread protests in Britain against a planned Trump state 
visit155 and the public demonstrations against his scaled-down ‘working visit’ to Britain in July 
2018156 show how controversial the US President is in British politics.  
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Conclusion 
To paraphrase Dean Acheson’s famous quote: Britain has lost Europe and not yet found a role. 
Brexit has created a ‘role crisis’ for Britain, which may represent a fundamental turning point 
in its foreign policy orientation going forward. Two different types of role conflicts play into 
this: the degree to which these roles are mutually incompatible and the nature and variety of 
international actors each role must engage. The former has made for rather undirected foreign 
policy, and the latter risks pushing Britain toward the path of least resistance: the roles of 
faithful ally to the US, or isolate. In unpacking this ‘role crisis’, we hope to facilitate a reflexive 
and critical discussion about possible future trajectories of British foreign policy after Brexit.  
 
Tensions between the different roles Britain seeks is giving rise to a role conflict where ego’s 
role conceptions are incompatible with one another. Pursuing these roles at the same time can 
make for an incoherent foreign policy.157 For example, Britain’s efforts to play the role of 
global trading state are difficult to sync with the role of regional partner to the EU, not least 
because WTO rules imply inevitable trade-offs for Britain between embracing a customs union 
with the EU and having the freedom to pursue its own trade deals with non-EU countries.158 
The role of great power sits uncomfortably with that of faithful ally to the US, as the former 
portrays significant foreign policy autonomy but the latter compels a good measure of 
compliance. The contest between a British and an Indian candidate for a seat on the benches of 
the ICJ illustrates the trade-offs between the great power and leader of the Commonwealth 
roles. These role conflicts confound Britain’s efforts to chart a clear foreign policy course, as 
efforts in one direction clash with efforts in another. Without a clear direction it will be difficult 
for Britain to enact any role.   
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Moreover, international responses to its disjointed efforts to enact these different roles have 
largely been negative, creating additional role conflict between Britain’s role conception(s) and 
alters’ role expectations. Role theorists see this as potentially giving rise to poor relations 
between ego and alters.159 In the British case, this form of role conflict may be related to the 
number and type of international actors that must be engaged by each role, as a wider range of 
interested and powerful alters is likely to generate more resistance and alter-casting. While a 
single alter might accept or reject a new role sought by ego, if multiple alters are involved 
socialisation becomes more complicated. Alters may seek cues from others about how to 
respond to ego’s efforts, and thus the nature of alters’ relationships to one another must also be 
considered.      
 
This is clearly problematic for the role of great power, which is global in scope and requires 
acceptance by not only former EU partners Germany and France but also the US and other 
powers. Similarly, the leader of the Commonwealth role reaches broadly but lands awkwardly 
on those who would have to play the corollary ‘follower’ roles and who are instead seeking 
better trade deals. Britain would also have to overcome many obstacles to enact the role of 
global trading state, as individual countries might entertain trade deals with Britain but must 
also consider their relationship with the EU as a global economic actor. The regional partner 
to the EU role is challenged by EU-27 solidarity in its economic negotiations, and British 
efforts to highlight the value of security and counter-terrorism partnership can’t readily be 
separated from other regional partner dimensions. While the role of faithful ally to the US 
might be achievable for post-Brexit Britain, requiring the consent of only one major actor, its 
longer-term viability appears uncertain. Given the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ 
agenda this role is itself tinged with isolationism.  
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The irony, therefore, is that Britain could end up being socialised into the one role it is trying 
to avoid – the role of isolate. In order to prevent this outcome, Britain might eventually put 
more weight on those roles that encounter the least resistance internationally, thereby reducing 
role conflicts. Overall, the role conflicts between Britain and different sets of alters, as well as 
among its own proposed roles, have constrained British agency in the early stages of role 
socialisation. The Brexit case gives us novel insights about the importance of role conflicts, 
which have not received systematic attention in role theory research. Role theory, in turn, helps 
illuminate the sources and nature of the intense debates over the UK’s future as an international 
actor.    
 
As yet, Britain’s role conflicts appear to remain largely unresolved.  Whilst Brexit negotiations 
between Britain and the EU-27 are undeniably intricate and consequential, locating a foreign 
policy role for Britain after Brexit arguably would be even more difficult and fundamental. The 
remaining EU countries will survive the Brexit crisis and may set Europe sailing in new 
directions, leaving Britain more fully free to be alone playing the role of a sovereign castaway 
on an island largely of its own making. While Brexit may enhance Britain’s sovereignty, it did 
not free its foreign policy, which remains conflicted between its anti-isolationist goals and the 
international community’s reluctance to accept the alternative roles it seeks to play. The 
outcome of the long game is still anyone’s guess, but the opening act of the Brexit play has set 
the stage for a difficult finale. 
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